Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (part 2) by Botha, Henk
Metaphoric reasoning and transformative
constitutionalism (part 2)*
HENK BOTHA**
6 In search of new metaphors: law as an expression of relationship and dialogue
I have argued above that the apartheid logic of separation and exclusivity was
structured in terms of the container metaphor. Racial and other identities and
physical spaces were thought to have clear boundaries, which separated white
from black, men from women and owners from non-owners. Legal concepts
and categories were thought to mirror reality. It was, for instance, believed that
race and gender referred to natural, immutable characteristics; that legal con-
cepts such as property and contract could be defined in terms of essential
attributes; that legal relationships were governed by scientific logic. This in-
duced normative closure. Normative distinctions (eg between white and black,
the public and private, the legislative and judicial functions, or ownership and
other real rights) were treated as absolute and impenetrable boundaries. Nor-
mative questions about the relation between different race groups or the dis-
tribution of land were reduced to technical questions about the best way to give
effect to pre-existing boundaries.
The South African constitution requires lawyers to abandon the formalism,
objectivism and reductionism which characterised law under apartheid. It re-
quires them to reconceive notions like individual rights, the rule of law, de-
mocracy, intergovernmental relations and the separation of powers in less
essentialist terms; to reconceptualise the relationship between law and politics,
the individual and society, private and public law, and common law and leg-
islation in ways that transcend the dichotomies and hierarchies which charac-
terised apartheid law. The constitution, in my understanding, seeks to uphold
the rule of law without postulating a rigid division between law and politics.78
It entrenches fundamental individual rights, but does not entrench an abstract
individualism which sees the individual as prior to and detached from the
society in which she lives.79 It is committed to the separation of powers, but
not to the idea of strict boundaries between the legislature, executive and
judiciary.80 It provides for a division of authority among the national, provin-
cial and local spheres of government, but characterises the relationship be-
tween the different spheres as one of co-operation, rather than a strict
* Part 1 of this article appeared in 2002 TSAR 612.
* Professor of Law, Unisa.
78 See Botha (n 55).
79 As Sachs J remarked in his concurring opinion in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian
Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC) par 117: ``While recognising the unique
worth of each person, the Constitution does not presuppose that a holder of rights is an isolated,
lonely and abstract figure possessing a disembodied and socially disconnected self. It
acknowledges that people live in their bodies, their communities, their cultures, their places
and their times.''
80 De Ville (n 47) 24-25 argues that the relationship between the judiciary and other branches of
government is best characterised as a dialogue, rather than as a rigid division.
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division or hierarchy.81 The constitution also relativises the distinction between
private law and public law82 and between common law and legislation. At least
some of the rights in the bill of rights bind private actors;83 and common law,
along with legislation and customary law, must be developed to promote the
spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights.84
The constitution, then, requires us to reconsider the dichotomies in terms of
which apartheid law was structured, to move beyond an objectivist approach
to categorisation, and to reconceive legal concepts and categories in relational
terms. The constitution does not seek to entrench rigid boundaries between the
individual and collective,85 but requires us to structure social relationships in a
way that is conducive to the dignity, equality and freedom of all. It stresses the
importance of co-operation and dialogue in the relationship among different
organs of state, and requires the entire legal system to be harmonised with the
constitution. In short, the constitution eschews the idea that adjudication is
simply a matter of categorisation on the basis of fixed, essential properties, or
that legal concepts have rigid boundaries. It recognises that social and institu-
tional relations are constructed rather than objectively given, that we do have a
choice in structuring relationships, that things can be different.
The constitution also represents a fundamental break with the assumption
that it is possible to capture the essence of people's identities, or acceptable to
erect legal walls of separation to prevent challenges to an individual's or
group's self-understanding. The constitution seems to recognise that individual
and collective identities are not natural or prepolitical, but are created discur-
sively. These identities are not cast in stone, but are subject to a continuous
process of self-revision. For instance, the constitution seeks to prevent a repeti-
tion of the past, when racial and other differences between individuals were
used to determine their status and worth. It outlaws unfair discrimination on
grounds such as race, gender, disability, sexual orientation, religion and lan-
guage.86 It is committed to the eradication of systemic or structural inequality,
and prohibits the state from basing its decisions on, or perpetuating, harmful
81 See ch 3 of the constitution. See also Simeon ``Considerations on the design of federations: the
South African constitution in comparative context'' 1998 SA Public Law 42.
82 Cf the dictum of Ackermann J in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC)
par 57 that ``it could be dangerous to attach consequences to or infer solutions from concepts
such as `public law' and `private law' when the validity of such concepts and the distinctions
which they imply are being seriously questioned''.
83 See s 8(2).
84 s 39(2).
85 This is evident from the fact that the bill of rights imposes a positive obligation on the state to
promote and fulfil the rights guaranteed in it (eg s 7(2)), provides for the horizontal application
of fundamental rights (eg s 8(2), 8(3) and 9(4)), and guarantees socio-economic rights (eg s 26, 27
and 28(1)(c)) alongside civil and political rights. It is also hard to square the inclusion of a
general limitation clause (s 36) with a view of rights as rigid boundaries between the individual
and collective.
86 s 9(3) and (4).
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stereotypes.87 It seeks to promote multiculturalism and multilinguism,88 and
requires the state to protect the individual in the free development of her
personality.
It has also been argued that the constitution favours ``a cosmopolitan under-
standing of the nation as a nation of citizens over and against an ethnocentric
interpretation of the nation as a prepolitical unity''.89 The constitution, in this
view, does not present the South African nation as something that is fully
accomplished and enclosed within well-defined boundaries. The national iden-
tity and the bounds of the political community can be defined only in relational
terms; they are open to an ongoing process of contestation and redefinition.90
Instead of assuming the political community's moral completeness, constitu-
tional decision-makers should acknowledge their own responsibility in the
construction of a national identity. Their decisions never simply reflect the
choices made by ``the people'' at some historical moment, or the moral con-
sensus of ``the people'' at present, but are partly constitutive of the way we
perceive ourselves and define the bounds of the political community.91
A number of metaphors have been used to express this concern with rela-
tionship, rather than with the supposed essences of people or things. I shall
87 The constitutional court found in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (n 79) that the
outlawing of sex between consenting men stigmatised gay sex, reinforced existing prejudices
against gays, and impaired their dignity, personhood and identity. See in particular par 23, 28
(Ackermann J) and 108-109 (Sachs J, concurring). It was also found in Hoffmann v South
African Airways 2000 11 BCLR 1211 (CC) par 35-37 that an organ of state may not base its
treatment of people who are HIV positive on prejudice and stereotyping. Cf also the finding of
Sachs J in his minority judgment in Harksen v Lane 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC) that s 21 of the
Insolvency Act promoted ``a stereotyped and outdated view of marriage'' which ``inhibits the
capacity for self-realisation of the spouses, affects the quality of their relationship with each
other as free and equal persons within the union, and encourages society to look at them not as
`a couple' made up of two persons with independent personalities and shared lives, but as `a
couple' in which each loses his or her individual existence'' (par 124). Cf President of the RSA v
Hugo 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC). In his dissenting judgment in Hugo, Kriegler J described the
assumption that women are the primary care givers of young children, upon which a presidential
pardon to mothers in prison was based, as ``a root cause of women's inequality in our society. It
is both a result and a cause of prejudice; a societal attitude which relegates women to a
subservient, occupationally inferior yet unceasingly onerous role. It is a relic and a feature of the
patriarchy which the Constitution so violently condemns'' (par 80). The majority conceded that
the president's act rested upon a stereotype that was harmful to women, but found that the
discrimination in question was not unfair, as South African mothers still generally bear far
greater burdens than fathers in the rearing of children. See par 109-115.
88 See eg s 6, 29(2), 30, 31, 185 and 186.
89 Davis (n 9) 10 (quoting Habermas).
90 See Davis (n 89) 9-13; Botha The Legitimacy of Law and the Politics of Legitimacy: Beyond a
Constitutional Culture of Justification (unpublished LLD thesis, Pretoria (1998)) 409-412.
91 In the words of Michelman Brennan and Democracy (1999) 52: ``A minor national refounding
occurs with every judicial resolution of a reasonably contested question of constitutional
meaning.'' The capacity of judicial decisions to help shape the national identity is dramatically
illustrated by the decisions of the US supreme court in Dred Scott v Sandford 60 US 393 (1857)
and Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954). The court legitimised slavery in Dred Scott.
Brown, on the other hand, outlawed racial segregation in public education, and had a profound
effect on political beliefs and attitudes in the USA. Cf also the decision of the appellate division
in Collins v Minister of the Interior 1957 1 SA 552 (A) Ð the decision which finally enabled the
South African government to remove coloured voters from the common voters' roll.
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mention only a few metaphors which have been used to describe rights or rights
litigation under the constitution. In the first place, rights are sometimes de-
scribed as a relationship.92 Rights, in this view, are not rooted in abstract
individualism. They are, rather, an expression of connectedness among the
self and others. On this understanding, the language of individual rights is
fully compatible with the insight that the self is forged within a network of
social relations, that the self is always situated within a concrete context.
It is important to understand that these metaphors of connectedness and
situatedness need not result in a form of collectivism, and do not imply a return
to objectivist categorisation. Connection does not imply identity or sameness,
but refers to a link between things or people that are different and separate
from each other.93 It is an expression of relatedness, not of fixed, essential
characteristics. Moreover, to be situated within a particular context is not
the same as being enclosed within a particular (objectivist) category.94 Contexts
are not fixed, immutable or based upon essential characteristics. They are,
rather, relational, overlapping and forever changing. They are also a matter
of perception, perspective and imagination. By situating legal actors within
concrete contexts, we do not attempt to capture their essence and strip away
all that is inessential. We are, rather, trying to understand the world from their
perspective, by placing ourselves imaginatively in their shoes.95
To claim that individual identities are shaped discursively, that the values
and ends chosen by individuals are influenced by their social and cultural
backgrounds, interaction with others and the power relations within a society,
is therefore not to assert the primacy of the collective over the individual, or to
deny the possibility of individual autonomy. It is, rather, to inquire into the
conditions of autonomy. In the words of Frank Michelman:
``Individuals are what matter in the end. Individuals are also, however, as a matter of fact,
socially constituted, enmeshed in various relations and communities, thoughtways and cultures,
institutions and practices. Out of these multiple, overlapping formative contexts, individuality
forms itself. Individuals, then, depend for their identities and self-understandings on affiliation
and commitment, as they depend for justice, security, and certain other conditions of thriving on
public institutions of law and government.''96
By challenging the liberal conception of the individual as someone who exists
prior to any specific commitments, values or ends, and by situating the self within
concrete relationships and contexts, we may become able to counter the reduc-
tionism of law, to locate our understanding of law in the lived experience of
people affected by it. This should alert us to the fact that our social reality is
92 This conception of rights has been put forward by feminist and civic-republican authors in
North America. See eg Nedelsky ``Reconceiving rights as relationship'' 1993 Rev of
Constitutional Studies 1; Minow ``Interpreting rights: an essay for Robert Cover'' 1987 Yale
LJ 1860 and Michelman ``Justification (and justifiability) of law in a contradictory world'' in
Pennock and Chapman (eds) Justification in Law, Ethics and Politics (1986) 71 91. See also, in
the South African context, Albertyn and Goldblatt (n 9) 251-254.
93 See JWG van der Walt ``Die toekoms van die onderskeid tussen die publiekreg en die privaatreg
in die lig van die horisontale werking van die grondwet (deel 2)'' 2000 TSAR 605 607-608.
94 Cf the way in which Sachs J contrasted a context-based approach with a categorisation
approach in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (n 79) par 113 and 126.
95 The word ``context'' is derived from the Latin contextus (coherence, connection) and contexere
(to weave together). Contexts are, indeed, woven together from the multiple fabrics of our
existence, rather than simply found.
96 (n 91) 133 and see 66-67.
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infinitely more complex and varied than allowed for by the binary thought
structures characterising legal thinking. It should make us more perceptive to
prevailing patterns of disadvantage and inequality, and the ways in which
disadvantage and exclusion are naturalised and normalised in legal discourse.
It should also make us aware of the possibility that things can be different, that
our current world of inequality and stratification is not as inevitable as it may
appear to be.
A second metaphor, which is closely related to the idea of rights as relation-
ship, is that of rights as dialogue.97 If rights are conceived not as fixed bound-
aries, but as relationship, their content and limits must be subject to debate.
Rights, in this view, are not prepolitical, but are shaped through political and
legal discourse. Rights are not inimical to the democratic process, but provide
us with a vocabulary to discuss matters of common concern. The constitutio-
nalisation of rights needs not stifle democratic debate; it is, rather, a way of
facilitating and structuring debates over the reach and content of rights, the
justifiability of official conduct, the kind of social relationships envisaged by
the constitution, and/or the bounds of the political community.
The view of rights as dialogue emphasises the need for constitutional deci-
sion-makers to promote democratic dialogue not only by protecting the equal
right of everyone to engage in public discourse, but also by being receptive to
the broadest range of interests and interpretations that are publicly articulated.
According to Michelman, the official decisions that are most worthy of our
respect are those
``that pay us the respect of striving to make themselves ever more effectively available to be
influenced by public debates that are fully and fairly receptive to everyone's perceptions of
situation and interest and, relatedly, to everyone's opinions about justice ± including,
recursively, everyone's opinions about what sorts of arrangements really do make public
deliberations fairly receptive to everyone's views and really do render official bodies available to
the influence of those views''.98
The rights as dialogue metaphor also emphasises the shifting nature of our
understanding of rights. In terms of this metaphor, the content, reach and
permissible limitations of rights are determined through an ongoing process
of public dialogue. Current understandings of rights therefore remain open to
critical inquiry and a process of dialogic modulation and re-interpretation.
By conceiving rights as dialogue, we declare our readiness to listen to other
viewpoints, to enter into discussion over our own beliefs, to open ourselves to
the possibility of a dialogic modulation of deeply held convictions and preju-
dices. We commit ourselves to the idea of a public sphere that is characterised
97 See eg HaÈ berle Verfassung als oÈffentlicher Prozeû: Materialen zu einer Verfassungstheorie der
offenen Gesellschaft (1998); Michelman ``The Supreme Court 1985 term Ð Foreword: traces of
self-government'' 1986 Harvard LR 4 and Nedelsky (n 92). See also, in the South African
context, Mureinik ``A bridge to where? Introducing the interim bill of rights'' 1994 SAJHR 3;
Davis (n 9); Botha ``Judicial dissent and democratic deliberation'' 2000 SA Public Law 321 and
Le Roux ``From acropolis to metropolis: the new constitutional court building and South
African street democracy'' 2001 SA Public Law 139. Cf also Sachs J's observation in S v
Mhlungu 1995 7 BCLR 793 (CC) par 129 that constitutional interpretation takes the form of ``a
principled judicial dialogue, in the first place between members of this Court, then between our
Court and other courts, the legal profession, law schools, Parliament, and, indirectly, with the
public at large''.
98 (n 91) 59.
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by openness, equality and plurality, and the transformation of institutions that
do not fully embrace these values.
7 Proportionality and balance
It would appear, then, that the conception of rights as relationship and dialo-
gue is better suited to the democratic-transformative aspirations of the South
African constitution than the idea of rights as boundaries. The former concep-
tion of rights is said to promote a pluralistic, responsive democracy, in which
current understandings of the principles governing political life are subjected to
continual challenge and reconsideration. The latter is associated with norma-
tive closure: the idea of fixed boundaries between the individual and collective
allows constitutional interpreters to evade responsibility for their decisions
(``we are merely policing pre-existing boundaries; they were drawn not by us,
but by history, nature, or the authors of the constitution''), and makes current
patterns of inclusion and exclusion appear normal and natural.
Putting it differently, a rigid categorisation approach assumes that law is
neutral; that judges can avoid becoming embroiled in moral and political con-
troversies; that justice is blind and legal meaning disembodied. Against this
view, proponents of a relational, dialogic conception of rights recognise that
there are different ways of looking at the world; that legal distinctions do not
reflect pre-existing boundaries, but depend on the perspective of those making
them; that the idea of justice that is blind and therefore neutral with regard to
competing conceptions of the good invariably privileges certain ways of seeing
over others. Here, understanding is conceived metaphorically as seeing.99 One's
understanding of a legal problem is necessarily influenced by the lens through
which one looks at it and the angle and distance from which one perceives it.
The understanding is seeing metaphor enables us to scrutinise the concepts and
categories through which we filter legal problems; to stop focusing exclusively
on what is in the foreground of legal analysis and take time to examine the
background assumptions which condition what we see and how we perceive
it.100 It allows us to ask what is hidden or masked by a particular approach,
99 This is a conventional metaphor, which is closely related to the conduit metaphor discussed
above. However, unlike the conduit metaphor, which presents the interpreter as passive and
knowledge as more or less static, the understanding is seeing metaphor ``captures both the
dynamic quality of intellectual processes and the necessarily perspectival nature of human
knowledge, which, after all, is always knowledge from a point of view''. Winter A Clearing in the
Forest (n 5) 66. This is achieved by combining the conduit metaphor with the mind as body
metaphor, which conceptualises thought in terms of movement and exploration.
100 Critical legal theorists often point out, with reference to legal realism, that differences in power
and wealth in the ``private'' sphere never simply reflect the natural differences between
individuals, private choices and/or the workings of a free, self-regulating market, but are
shaped to a significant extent by the background rules of private law. A critical examination of
these background rules can give us a sense of the contingency of current social arrangements,
and help us to imagine more humane alternatives. See eg Klare ``Legal theory and democratic
reconstruction: reflections on 1989'' 1991 Univ British Columbia LR 69; and Williams ``Welfare
and legal entitlements: the social roots of poverty'' in Kairys (ed) The Politics of Law: A
Progressive Critique (1998) 569. See also Winter A Clearing in the Forest (n 5) 212-213. Winter
criticises the tendency of constitutional scholars to focus on ``the foreground question of
constitutional interpretation'', and to neglect the role of sedimented social meanings in legal
interpretation. He quotes from Llewellyn: ``An inch from the eye is a portion of the Text; the
whole living world is `covered' by it'' (212).
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and how it blinds us to alternatives.101 It reminds us that the ideals of imparti-
ality and even-handedness require a willingness to change perspective, to try to
see things through the eyes of the other.
It is hardly surprising that South African proponents of the idea of rights as
relationship/dialogue have stressed the need for the courts to move away from
a categorisation approach, and to adopt instead a justificatory or limitation-
based approach.102 A justificatory or limitation-based approach is said to be
relational to the extent that it focuses on the relationship between a funda-
mental-rights limitation and its purpose and/or the comparative weight of
competing rights and interests. It is dialogic to the extent that it institutes a
debate about the cogency of the justifications offered for the limitation of a
fundamental right, and requires judges to articulate the substantive reasons for
their decisions, rather than simply declare the case to fall within a particular
category.
The constitutional court's limitation jurisprudence can be seen as an attempt
to place relationship and context at the centre of fundamental-rights litigation,
and thus to avoid the rigidity of a categorisation approach. According to the
court, section 36(1)103 of the constitution involves ``the weighing up of compet-
ing values on a case-by-case basis to reach an assessment founded on propor-
tionality''.104 In determining whether the limitation of a fundamental right is
reasonable and justifiable, the court must be guided by the factors enumerated
in the subsection. However, these factors should not be seen as exhaustive. ``In
essence, the court must engage in a balancing exercise and arrive at a global
101 Again, this is a recurring theme in critical legal theory. See eg Kennedy ``The structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries'' 1979 Buffalo LR 205 (describing how mainstream legal scholarship
hides the fundamental contradiction which is at the heart of modern law).
102 See eg Mureinik (n 97); Van der Walt and Botha ``Coming to grips with the new constitutional
order: critical comments on Harksen v Lane NO'' 1998 SA Public Law 17; and particularly
Rautenbach ``The limitation of rights in terms of provisions in the bill of rights other than the
general limitation clause: a few examples'' 2001 TSAR 617. Rautenbach writes 639-640: ``The
bill of rights provisions concerning the limitation of rights embody the idea that in the field of
contact and contest to assert and protect interests neither the interests protected by the rights
nor the interests by virtue of which the rights may be limited prevail as of right. They serve the
purposes which Johan van der Walt has poignantly set out the distinction between justification
and justice: `[I]t vacates the scene of power. It proscribes the occupation of this scene. It reserves
this scene for the entry of more than one and/or multiple entries.' After the commencement of
the bill of rights, no party to a dispute in this field and no institution which has the power to
authoritatively settle the dispute is entitled to exclude bearers of the rights described in the bill
of rights by definition, to negate the duties prescribed in the bill of rights by definition, or to
place conduct and interests beyond the reach of the rights as formulated in the bill of rights by
definition Ð in every concrete dispute, an outcome must be achieved by taking into account
[the factors enumerated in section 36(1)]''.
103 ``The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors,
including Ð
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achive the purpose.''
104 S v Manamela (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 2000 5 BCLR 491 (CC) par 33. See also
S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 104.
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judgment on proportionality and not adhere mechanically to a sequential
check-list.''105
A variety of metaphors have been used to express this concern with balance
and proportionality. A limitation must be ``narrowly tailored to fit its pur-
pose''106 and may not use a sledgehammer to crack a nut.107 It must be prop-
erly focused,108 finely tuned,109 appropriately balanced,110 and not too great in
sweep.111
Of these metaphors, the balancing metaphor is perhaps the most common ±
and also the most controversial. The balancing metaphor is directly grounded
in our experience as embodied beings.112 As babies, we learn to acquire a
balanced, erect posture. When we lose our balance and fall, we rise again
and ``re-establish a prior distribution of forces and weight relative to an ima-
ginary vertical axis''.113 We experience bodily health as equilibrium and sick-
ness as a loss of equilibrium. These basic bodily experiences are metaphorically
extended to structure our experience of psychological states and social relation-
ships.
In law, the balancing metaphor is most commonly identified with the weigh-
ing of conflicting values or interests. The legal decision-maker typically at-
taches weights to different legal interests. On this basis, it either pronounces
that one interest outweighs the other, or formulates a rule or standard which
attempts to strike a balance between conflicting rights or interests. Such an
approach has obvious advantages over a rigid categorisation approach. Con-
stitutional balancers do not assume that all cases can be fitted into neat cate-
gories; that they need simply give effect to pre-existing, bright-line boundaries
which demarcate the public from the private, or legitimise government objec-
tives from rights violations. It is often said that balancing signals a willingness
on the part of the judge to recognise the open and contested nature of (con-
stitutional) adjudication; to acknowledge the need to engage in substantive
legal reasoning and to engage with the social context.114 In the formulation
of Henkin, constitutional balancing ``provides bridges between the abstractions
of principle and the life of facts . . . . It softens the rigors of absolutes, makes
room for judgment and for sensitivity to differences of degree''.115
However, not everyone agrees that balancing is conducive to the realisation
of constitutional values such as democracy, accountability and the rule of law.
In the first place, critics argue that balancing is indeterminate and unprin-
cipled. In this view, it is impossible to reduce conflicting interests to a single
105 Manamela (n 104) par 32.
106 S v Dlamini; S v Dladla; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat 1999 7 BCLR 771 (CC) par 74.
107 Manamela (n 104) par 34.
108 S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo 1996 3 BCLR 293 (CC) par 24; Manamela (n 104) par 50.
109 Mbatha (n 108) par 21.
110 Mbatha (n 108) par 24.
111 Manamela (n 104) par 50.
112 See Johnson (n 3) 74-100.
113 (n 3) 76.
114 See egMichelman ``Conceptions of democracy in American constitutional argument: The case
of pornography regulation'' 1989 Tennessee LR 291 304-305.
115 ``Infallibility under law: constitutional balancing'' 1978 Columbia LR 1022 1047.
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measure of value.116 For instance, how is one to translate freedom of speech
and national security into a common currency for comparison? How are we to
balance values like equality and freedom of association, or environmental
conservation and economic development? The balancer, according to Frantz,
attempts to ``measur[e] the unmeasurable'' and to ``compare the incompar-
able''.117
The critics further point out that constitutional texts generally contain little
or no guidance on the relative weights to be attached to conflicting rights and
interests. Balancers, in their zeal to weigh up all relevant interests (whether
derived from the constitution or not), tend to lose sight of the constitutional
text. The weighting and ranking of interests are not grounded in constitutional
interpretation, but are based on the subjective preferences of individual
judges.118
These criticisms raise important questions about the separation of powers
between the legislature and judiciary. It is often said that balancing is essen-
tially a legislative function, and that judges should not second-guess the way
elected legislatures have decided to balance conflicting interests. Advocates of
balancing may counter that this argument rests upon an oversimplified view of
the division between the legislative and judicial functions, which fails to come
to terms with the realities of the modern state. But even if this is true, the
indeterminacy critique remains unsettling, as it raises the spectre of judicial
arbitrariness. Balancing, it is feared, may turn out to be a smokescreen which
allows judges to mask controversial value choices behind a supposedly objec-
tive evaluation of the relative weight of different legal interests.
Secondly, balancing is sometimes associated with a conservative bench. In
the United States, balancing got a bad name during the McCarthy era, when it
was used to rationalise and validate serious infringements of freedom of ex-
pression.119 However, this is not necessarily the case. Balancing often results in
an extension of the scope of constitutional rights and freedoms, and has, at
various times in history, been associated with liberal and progressive causes.120
But even if balancing does not necessarily translate into a readiness to sacrifice
individual rights and freedoms in the name of collective interests, there may
still be something conservative about it. Balancing is often associated with a
cautious, incremental approach. Balancers take account of a broad range of
consequences and considerations. They also tend to restrict their finding to the
case at hand, as the next case may require a different balance. There are
obvious advantages to such an approach; however, it is said to be unlikely
116 See eg Aleinikoff ``Constitutional law in the age of balancing'' 1987 Yale LJ 943 972-976;
Pretorius ``Meaning in constitutional interpretation'' 1998 Acta Juridica 282 286-287; Tushnet
``An essay on rights'' 1984 Texas LR 1363 1372-1373 and Woolman ``Out of order? Out of
balance? The limitation clause of the final constitution'' 1997 SAJHR 102 114-119.
117 ``Is the first amendment law? A reply to Professor Mendelson'' 1963 California LR 729 748.
118 Aleinikoff (n 116) 977 writes that ``balancing Ð by transforming any interest implicated by a
constitutional case into a constitutional interest Ð is the ultimate non-interpretivism''. See also
Blaauw-Wolf ``The `balancing of interests' with reference to the principle of proportionality and
the doctrine of GuÈterabwaÈgung Ð a comparative analysis'' 1999 SA Public Law 178 198.
119 See eg Dennis v United States 341 US 494 (1951). See also Frantz ``The first amendment in the
balance'' 1962 Yale LJ 1424.
120 See Sullivan ``Post-liberal judging: the roles of categorization and balancing'' 1992 Univ
Colorado LR 293 (describing the dialectical relationship between categorisation and balancing
in the USA).
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to result in sweeping reform or bold innovation.121 Putting it differently, bal-
ancers tend to take current distributions of wealth and power as their point of
departure, instead of subjecting them to a transformative critique.
Thirdly, balancing judges often resort to ``scientific'' language (eg cost-ben-
efit analysis) in an attempt to make their decisions appear objective. This may
result in a new type of formalism, which, like a rigid categorisation approach,
precludes dialogue about important moral and political issues. In the words of
Aleinikoff:122
``Scientifically styled opinions, written to answer charges of subjectivity, make us spectators as
the Court places the various interests on the scales. The weighing mechanism remains a mystery,
and the result is simply read off the machine. Scientific balancing decisions are neither opinions
nor arguments that can engage us; they are demonstrations.''
The fourth criticism is closely related to the second and third. It is said that
balancing rests upon the assumption that the primary aim of constitutional law
is to mediate between pre-existing interests. These interests are thought to be
exogenous to the legal process. This assumption precludes the possibility of a
constitutional dialogue which is characterised by diversity and a willingness on
the part of participants to subject their perceptions of self-interest to dialogic
modulation.123 Distinctiveness of voice is drowned out by the use of a suppo-
sedly neutral calculus, while the judge's role is seen as akin to that of a gro-
cer,124 rather than a facilitator of and participant in normative dialogue.
These are powerful criticisms which are not easily answered. However, I
believe that there is a case to be made for a form of balancing which is
grounded in practical reason rather than science, and which does not profess
to be value-neutral. Alternatively, one can argue for a form of proportionality
analysis in which the role of balancing is minimised. For instance, Stuart
Woolman125 argues that a comparison of the burdens imposed by a funda-
mental-rights limitation and the benefits said to flow from it should be under-
taken, if at all, only at the end of the limitation inquiry, after factors such as the
purpose of the limitation, the relation between the limitation and its purpose,
and the availability of less restrictive means have been considered. In a similar
vein, Canadian author David Beatty126 argues that courts should focus mainly
on the questions whether the means used by the government to translate its
objectives into law are rational and do not interfere with individual rights and
freedoms more than is necessary. They should, however, show deference to the
legislature's evaluation of the importance of particular government policies, as
measured against the adverse impact they may have on individuals. Such an
approach is said to institute a constitutional dialogue between the judiciary and
legislature over the least intrusive means to attain legislative ends, while leaving
it to the legislature to do the balancing.127
121 See Nagel ``Liberals and balancing'' 1992 Univ Colorado LR 319.
122 (n 116) 993.
123 (n 116) 993.
124 Sullivan (n 120) 293.
125 (n 116) 111.
126 ``The end of law: at least as we have known it'' in Devlin (ed) Constitutional Interpretation
(1991) 22.
127 Hogg and Bushell ``The Charter dialogue between courts and legislatures (or perhaps the
Charter isn't such a bad thing after all)'' 1997 Osgoode Hall LJ 75.
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An interesting attempt to place limitation analysis on a firmer grounding
than can be provided by the notion of balancing is that of the German con-
stitutional scholar Konrad Hesse. According to Hesse,128 the notion of a bal-
ancing of interests is not only too vague to guide constitutional decision-
making, but also detracts from the principle of the unity of the constitution.
He proposes instead the notion of a harmonisation and optimisation of con-
flicting interests (praktische Konkordanz). The constitutional decision-maker
may not simply declare the primacy of one set of constitutionally protected
interests over another, but must construe conflicting interests in a manner
which gives them both optimal protection. This is done through an inquiry
into the proportionality of fundamental-rights limitations. Constitutionally
protected interests may not be sacrificed in the name of a greater good and
may not be restricted more than is necessary.
The point of these attempts to rethink limitation analysis is not to banish the
balancing metaphor from constitutional adjudication,129 but to find an alter-
native to a crude model of weighting and ranking interests. Hesse's notion of
praktische Konkordanz itself invokes the image of rights and interests that are
held in balance by a process of constitutional interpretation which is aimed at
the harmonisation of conflicting legal interests. He seems to reject only one
variant of the law as balancing metaphor, and proposes another interpretation
which is better suited to the ideal of constitutional accountability.130
Consider, also, Stuart Woolman's endorsement of a storytelling approach to
limitation analysis as an alternative to judicial balancing.131 Woolman argues
that storytelling is well suited to constitutional adjudication, as it ``recognises a
plurality of different ways of looking at, understanding and being in the
world''.132 Storytelling can help us to make sense of complex and highly spe-
cific situations, and allows us to engage with concrete contexts and power
relations. Stories enable judges to make and explain hard legal choices ± with-
out trying to reduce incommensurable goods to a common measure of value, or
to articulate a unified theory which effectively denies the legitimacy of alter-
native ways of looking at the world.
Now, of course, we make sense of stories by virtue of our pre-understanding
of what a story is and how it is typically structured.133 For instance, we con-
ceptualise a story as something with a beginning, middle and end, which pro-
gresses along a path. Such unfolding of a story is often structured in terms of
the balancing metaphor. As Winter points out, numerous stories start
128 GrundzuÈge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1999) 28 142-143 146.
129 with the possible exception of Beatty's argument. See also Woolman (n 116) 134 n 66 on the
possibility of a non-balancing, deferential approach to limitation analysis. But see also Ely
``Flag desecration: a case study in the roles of categorization and balancing in first amendment
analysis'' 1975 Harvard LR 1482 1485-1487 (arguing that ``less restrictive alternative'' analysis
must involve balancing, as less restrictive alternatives usually involve some added cost).
130 Cf also HaÈ berle Die Wesensgehaltgarantie des Art 19 Abs 2 Grundgesetz (1983). Unlike Hesse,
HaÈ berle advocates a balancing approach. However, his understanding of a balancing of
interests is in many respects similar to Hesse's notion of praktische Konkordanz. See Hesse (n
128) 28 n 31.
131 (n 116) 119-133.
132 (n 31) 121.
133 Put differently, ``we have an idealized cognitive model for the concept `story' ''. Winter A
Clearing in the Forest (n 5) 107.
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``with the description of a status quo: an initial state in which life is in harmonious balance.
Something disturbs the balance ± a need, a lack, a deprivation, or a transformation. The
protagonist sets out to restore the balance. There is conflict and resolution. The original state is
restored, or some new balance is attained''.134
By conceptualising legal decision-making as a type of storytelling, Woolman
tacitly invokes the balancing metaphor. However, he does so in a way which
allows for a far more nuanced approach than simply attaching weights to
conflicting interests.
8 Rethinking categorisation
Whatever the criticisms against a categorisation approach, it seems impossible
to dispense with categorisation. Before a court can inquire into the reason-
ableness and justifiability of a fundamental-rights limitation, it must first ans-
wer questions such as whether the bill of rights applies to the dispute at hand,
whether the applicant has standing, and whether a fundamental right has been
limited. That these inquiries may tempt judges to fall back on old, formalistic
habits is evident from a line of cases in which the constitution's application
provisions were interpreted overly restrictively,135 in which rights were inter-
preted without due regard to the values underlying them,136 and in which
courts showed insensitivity to context and/or the structural dimensions of
power.137
The challenge, it seems, is not to eliminate categorisation from constitutional
adjudication (that would be impossible),138 but to reconceive categorisation in
relational terms. Such an approach must break with the objectivist assumption
that our categories mirror reality, or that we can decide cases correctly and
objectively by fitting them into the right category. It must acknowledge that
our concepts and categories are products of human experience and imagina-
tion, which may need to be remodelled and re-imagined in the light of changing
circumstances and new experiences. Far from being a mechanical process
134 (n 5) 109-110.
135 See eg Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) (interim constitution has no direct
horizontal application); Korf v Health Professions Council of South Africa 2000 3 BCLR 309 (T)
(Health Professions Council is not an organ of state).
136 See eg Woolman's critique of Beinash v Young 1999 2 SA 125 (CC) in ``The right consistency''
1999 SAJHR 166.
137 See eg the criticisms of the constitutional court's majority judgment in Hugo (n 87) in Davis (n
9) 79-84 and VanMarle ``Equality: an ethical interpretation'' 2000 THRHR 595 599-600; and of
the majority judgment in Harksen (n 87) in Albertyn and Goldblatt (n 9) 261-263; Davis (n 9)
90-92; and Van der Walt and Botha (n 102).
138 That it is not possible to avoid categorisation is also evident from the fact that s 9 outlaws
unfair discrimination on specified grounds such as race, gender and sexual orientation.
Discrimination on any of the listed grounds is deemed to be unfair. Claimants are thus required
to locate themselves within a particular group, to ignore their own experience of the
dehumanising effects of such categorisation and to ``caricature themselves in order to fit into
. . . rigid categories''. Jagwanth ``What is the difference? Group categorisation in Pretoria City
Council v Walker 1998 2 SA 363 (CC)'' 1999 SAJHR 200 207. Pieterse ``Stereotypes, sameness,
difference and human rights: catch 22?'' 2001 SA Public Law 92 102 argues that s 9
demonstrates both the reliance of legal and constitutional discourse on potentially harmful
social constructs, and the constitution's commitment to eradicate the stereotypes arising from
these constructs.
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which simply affirms the real-life essences of persons or things, legal categor-
isation is an imaginative activity which depends on metaphors and other forms
of figurative speech, and which does not allow us to evade responsibility for the
moral and political implications of legal decisions.
The constitutional court's jurisprudence on the right to privacy contains
traces of such an approach to categorisation. The court has made it clear in
a number of judgments that rights, including the right to privacy, should not be
construed as rigid boundaries which shield socially detached individuals from
state interference. In the view of the court, such a conception of rights is
untenable for at least three reasons. First, no right is absolute: ``from the outset
of interpretation each right is always already limited by every other right
accruing to another citizen''.139 Second, individual rights are not premised
upon a view of individuals as unencumbered selves, but are fully compatible
with the idea that individuals are socially constituted.140 For instance, what is
protected by the right to privacy is not merely the right to be left alone, but the
right freely to express one's personality and to form intimate relationships.141
And third, rights are not merely a shield against government interference in the
private sphere; even the right to privacy places a positive duty on the state ``to
promote conditions in which personal self-realisation can take place''.142
The court conceptualises the right to privacy not in terms of the container
metaphor, but as a radial category consisting of both core and peripheral areas.
Consider, for instance, the following observation of Ackermann J on the scope
of the constitutional right to privacy in Bernstein v Bester:
``[I]t is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and
home environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community. . . .
Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal
relations and activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space
shrinks accordingly.''143
Here the right to privacy is presented as having an inner core which is shielded
from the erosive impact of conflicting interests, as well as peripheral areas
139 Bernstein v Bester 1996 4 BCLR 449 (CC) par 67.
140 According to Ackermann J in Bernstein at par 67, this follows from the fact that rights are not
absolute: ``[C]ommunity rights and the rights of fellows members place a corresponding
obligation on a citizen, thereby shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards
identifying a concrete member of civil society.'' See also par 65-66.
141 (n 140); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (n 79) par 32 (Ackermann J), 116
(Sachs J).
142 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (n 79) par 116 (Sachs J concurring). See also
Sachs J's opinion in Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC) par 250-251 (role of the state in
promoting personal freedom); and the opinion of the court in In re: Certification of the
Constitution of the RSA, 1996 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) par 77 (the enforcement of civil and
political rights, just like that of socio-economic rights, may have direct budgetary implications);
Christian Education SA v Minister of Education 2000 10 BCLR 1051 (CC) par 40 (state under a
constitutional duty to take steps to protect all people and especially children from
maltreatment, abuse and degradation); and Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security
2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC) (obligation on the state to prevent gender-based discrimination and to
protect the dignity, freedom and security of women).
143 (n 139) par 67.
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where the privacy right is more likely to be outweighed by conflicting commu-
nity rights.144
It may appear from the statement quoted above that privacy is conceptua-
lised purely as physical space, that the core of the privacy right is constituted by
the physical enclosure of the home, and that the right gets progressively weaker
as one moves into the public sphere. Such a spatial conception of privacy
would share many of the problems of the idea of rights as boundaries. It would
tend to shield abusive and violent behaviour from state interference, as long as
it is confined to the private space of the family home. It would insulate con-
tentious social issues from democratic debate and perpetuate the subordination
of vulnerable groups, such as women and children. It would make challenges
under the right to privacy turn on a formalistic inquiry into the place where an
alleged violation occurred, rather than the values it seeks to protect.
However, it would be wrong to interpret Ackermann J's discussion of the
scope of the privacy right in purely spatial terms. Elsewhere in the judgment, he
seems to approve the view that the concept of privacy has not one, but three
cores: the first relating to private living space, the second inhering in the
person, and the third concerning the protection of certain relationships.145
He also makes it clear that the right to privacy is not simply a right to be
left alone, but is, more fundamentally, a right to ``have one's own autonomous
identity''.146 Autonomy is not construed merely negatively, but as the right of a
socially constituted individual, who is enmeshed in various relations, cultures,
communities and thoughtways, to develop and express her own identity.
It follows that the right to privacy is neither restricted to, nor absolute
within, the physical enclosure of the home. It may well be that the right will
be most jealously guarded where two or three of the core areas overlap. For
instance, the court found in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality
that the criminal prohibition of sodomy infringed both the right to equality
and the right to privacy. This prohibition not only penetrated into the private
living space of gays, but also restricted their capacity to establish an autono-
mous identity and to form intimate relationships. By contrast, the court made
it clear in S v Baloyi that privacy may not be used to justify non-interference in
domestic violence.147
It seems as if the idea of rights as radial categories offers far more scope for a
critical debate about the meaning of constitutional norms than the idea of
rights as boundaries. It may also allow us to rethink the relationship between
categorisation and limitation analysis. The closer a limitation comes to the core
of a right, the heavier the burden on the state should be to justify the limitation.
144 See par 90. See also the references under s 3 above on the idea of radial categories which consist
of a central case and certain conventionalised extensions. The idea of legal categories as having
both a core and peripheral areas is closely related to the idea that a legal norm or concept has
both a core meaning which is relatively settled, and penumbral areas where the meaning and
applicability of the norm or concept are less certain. See egHart ``Positivism and the separation
of law and morals'' 1958 Harvard LR 593 at 607 ff; Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965)
(per Douglas J); Henly `` `Penumbra': the roots of a legal metaphor'' 1987 Hastings
Constitutional LQ 81 and Winter A Clearing in the Forest (n 5) 197-202.
145 par 65 n 89; par 80.
146 par 65. Cf also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (n 79) par 117 (Sachs J
concurring).
147 2000 1 BCLR 86 (CC) par 16-18.
[ISSN 0257 ± 7747] TSAR 2003.1
METAPHORIC REASONING AND TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 33
However, where the periphery of a right has been affected, there is a greater
chance that the right will be outweighed by conflicting societal interests.
9 Concluding remarks
Legal reasoning, like all forms of reasoning, is structured metaphorically.
Many of our metaphors are so deeply entrenched in our conceptual system
that we are often not even aware of them. This has serious implications for
attempts to transform the legal order, as our ability to imagine alternatives to
current legal understandings and practices is constrained by cognitive processes
that we are hardly aware of.
In this article I have explored some of the metaphors that are used to
describe rights and rights adjudication under the constitution. I have argued
that the idea of rights as relationship and of fundamental rights litigation as
dialogue can enable more humane possibilities than the idea of rights as
boundaries. I have argued further that the balancing metaphor, the various
metaphors in terms of which proportionality analysis is structured, and the
idea of legal concepts as radial categories can assist us in developing a rela-
tional, contextual and potentially transformative constitutional jurisprudence.
However, these metaphors are themselves partial, and highlight certain as-
pects of our experience at the expense of others. They are, moreover, open to
different interpretations. For instance, the balancing metaphor is often used to
stress the need for judges to move away from a rigid categorisation approach,
to be sensitive to context, to acknowledge responsibility for their decisions.
However, the same metaphor has been used to underpin a new type of form-
alism, to reduce complex normative questions to the application of a ``scien-
tific'' method, to hide controversial value choices behind a supposedly neutral
weighting of interests.
The debate on alternatives to balancing also demonstrates that the same
metaphor can be elaborated differently. For instance, Hesse's notion of prak-
tische Konkordanz invokes the metaphor of balance; however, it refuses to treat
constitutional rights as expendable interests that can simply be outweighed by
conflicting considerations. In Hesse's view, it is the task of the constitutional
interpreter to harmonise conflicting constitutional values, to optimise the scope
of different constitutional interests, to integrate conflicting considerations into
the normative universe governed by the constitution. Such an approach has
obvious advantages over a simple weighting of interests. However, if we truly
believe that the constitution recognises the equal moral citizenship of all, that
no one's constitutional rights may simply be negated in the name of a suppo-
sedly higher interest, we should take care not to invoke this conception of
balance in such a manner that we convince ourselves that there is a ``natural
and seamless concord''148 between conflicting rights and interests. Even if we
succeed in keeping a variety of constitutional rights and interests in play with-
out subjugating or reducing some to others, we are still bound to sacrifice
legitimate interests in our attempts to harmonise, optimise and integrate con-
flicting claims and values. To deny this in the name of an underlying balance or
unity would be to dismiss the legitimacy of deeply held convictions, to banish
148 Rautenbach (n 102) 639.
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certain claimants from the moral community. Important as it is, the rhetoric of
balance and optimisation needs to be supplemented by a recognition of the
sacrifice and harm that are invariably sanctioned by law.149
Legal history offers numerous examples of the use of metaphors to challenge
conventional wisdom and reformulate rules and standards.150 Such metaphors
often have great liberating potential; however, unless used critically and reflec-
tively, these metaphors soon become inscribed in a new orthodoxy, which
makes it just as difficult to imagine new alternatives.
AndreÂ van der Walt's analysis of the metaphor of the constitution as a bridge
between an authoritarian past and a future founded on democracy and human
rights151 is a brilliant example of the type of critical, imaginative reflection on
metaphors advocated in this article. Van der Walt argues that the conventional
understanding of the constitution as an instrument that allows us to get out of
one place (apartheid) to another (constitutional democracy), rests upon the
assumption that both apartheid and constitutionalism are more or less fixed,
stationary positions. Constitutional transformation is understood in terms of a
linear progression from one position to another. While this metaphor captures
something of the dynamic nature of South Africa's journey to democracy, it
fails to account for the complexity and inherent uncertainty of the transforma-
tion process. It assumes that the past is completely knowable,152 that the
destination of the transition process can be clearly defined in advance, that
the constitutional transformation will be completed once the bridge has been
crossed. Van der Walt advances an alternative interpretation of the bridge
metaphor,
``where the bridge is not simply an instrument for getting out of one place and into another, but
an edifice that is inherently related to the abyss which it spans. Here, the focus is not on the two
spaces on either side of the abyss, but on the abyss itself ± the bridge is functionally and
essentially linked to and obtain its significance from the abyss beneath it, so that the bridge is
not a temporary instrument for a single crossing, one way, but allows and invites multiple
crossings, in both directions, since there is no inherent value attached to being on one side of the
bridge rather than the other. In this alternative interpretation of the bridge metaphor the danger
is to stay on one side, while the bridge allows us to connect one side with the other''.153
It is significant that Van der Walt does not discard the bridge metaphor, but
rather reinterprets it in a less linear, more historicist and relational manner. His
argument is still constrained by the metaphor of the bridge; however, by em-
phasising other aspects of our experience of (literal and metaphorical) bridges,
he is able to move beyond the narrow, instrumentalist conception of constitu-
tionalism and democracy that informs the dominant interpretation.
The metaphors we use constrain, but do not determine, our choices. The
challenge is to use metaphors in a reflective and imaginative manner, to be alert
149 See Van der Walt and Botha ``Democracy and rights in South Africa: beyond a constitutional
culture of justification'' 2000 Constellations 341; Van der Walt ``Law as sacrifice'' 2001 TSAR
710.
150 See Winter A Clearing in the Forest (n 5) 259-294 for examples from American constitutional
history.
151 (n 9) 294 ff.
152 See De Vos ``A bridge too far? History as context in the interpretation of the South African
constitution'' 2001 SAJHR 1 for a critique of this assumption.
153 Van der Walt (n 9) 295-296.
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to the ways in which metaphors highlight certain aspects of our experience,
while downplaying or hiding others, to open up new possibilities through the
reinterpretation of existing metaphors and the use of alternative metaphors
which enable different ways of seeing and thinking.
SAMEVATTING
METAFORIESE DENKE EN TRANSFORMERENDE KONSTITUSIONALISME (deel 2)
Regsdenke word in terme van metafore gestruktureer. Die metaforiese aard van regsdenke word
egter dikwels deur regsgeleerdes negeer, wat nog vasklou aan die objektivistiese siening dat
regsbegrippe met 'n objektiewe werklikheid ooreenstem. In dieÂ artikel, ondersoek die skrywer 'n
aantal metafore wat onderliggend was aan die apartheidsregsorde, sowel as sommige van die
metafore wat gebruik word om die nuwe grondwetlike orde te beskryf. Die skrywer argumenteer
dat die idee van regte as verhouding en/of dialoog, en die metafore van balansering en regte as
straalvormige kategorieeÈ veel meer kritiese en transformerende moontlikhede bied as die idee van
regte/begrippe as houers. Die metafore wat gebruik word om die nuwe grondwetlike orde te
beskryf, beklemtoon egter self sekere aspekte van ons ervaring ten koste van ander, en moet self
voortdurend herinterpreteer en opnuut bedink word.
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